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While most trade agreements were about goods up until 2000, many countries have
been and are now adopting services provisions. They do so by adding them to prior
goods-only agreements or by concluding new agreements jointly for goods and services.
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1 Introduction
Of the 81 preferential trade agreements notiﬁed to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and in force prior to the year 2000, 73 (90%) featured provisions dealing exclusively with
trade in goods. Since then and up until August 2015, another 194 PTAs have come into force
of which 124 (64%) also include provisions on services trade. This development indicates
the rising importance of services trade in general, the growing need felt by countries to place
such trade on a ﬁrmer institutional and rule-making footing, and the attractiveness of doing
so on an expedited basis via preferential negotiating platforms (see Sauvé and Shingal, 2011).
Of the 132 services trade agreements (STAs) notiﬁed until August 2015, 114 were notiﬁed
jointly with goods trade agreements (GTAs). At the time the 132 STAs entered into force,
116 did so jointly with GTAs.1 Less than 15% of all STAs in force to date were notiﬁed to
the WTO sequentially to GTAs, and the majority of these were notiﬁed after a GTA was
already in eﬀect between trading partners. Only with the ASEAN-South Korea agreement2
and the European Union-FYROM agreement an STA came into eﬀect prior to a GTA.
Services contribute a signiﬁcant share to economic activity in most developing and transition
countries which is larger than that of manufacturing. At the same time, cross-border services
transactions are smaller than trade of manufactures. This stylized fact has triggered a
rapidly-growing literature on the policy domain of services impediments (see Francois and
Hoekman, 2010, for a survey; see Roy, 2011; Miroudot, Sauvage, and Shepherd, 2012; van
der Marel and Shepherd, 2013; Borchert et al.,2014; van der Marel and Miroudot, 2014; for
speciﬁc examples). This interest extends beyond unilateral barriers to cross-border services
transactions, covering provisions on services trade in preferential trade agreements (see Egger
and Wamser, 2013; Cole and Guillin, 2015). While the respective literature contributes to
the understanding of whether and among which countries STAs are desirable and actually
implemented, it does not address the issue of joint versus sequential STAs and GTAs. It is
the present paper's goal to ﬁll this gap by conducting an empirical analysis based on all STAs
and GTAs notiﬁed to the WTO until the end of August 2015 and covered by its so-called
RTA-IS database.
1E.g., the European Community Treaty was notiﬁed in 1957 for goods and 1995 for services but entered
into eﬀect for both in 1958; the North American Free Trade Agreement was notiﬁed in 1993 for goods and
1995 for services but entered into eﬀect for both in 1994; the enlargement of the European Union to 27
member countries was notiﬁed in 2006 for goods and 2007 for services but entered into eﬀect for both in
2007; and the European Union-Ukraine accord was notiﬁed for both goods and services in 2014 but had not
entered into eﬀect by August 2015. The enlargement of the European Union to 15 member countries and
the Chile-El Salvador agreement may be thought of a joint STA-GTA agreements as in both cases an STA
was notiﬁed within a week of the notiﬁcation of the GTA.
2The ASEAN-Korea agreement remains un-notiﬁed to the WTO by the end of August 2015.
2 Empirical strategy
Let us use Aij and Sij to denote binary indicator variables which are unity if an STA of
any kind  jointly or sequentially with a GTA  exists between countries i and j and if
it was concluded jointly with a GTA, respectively, or not. Let us generally use stars to
denote latent variables and refer to the latent gains from concluding any STA be A∗ij so
that Aij = 1(A
∗
ij > 0). Moreover, consider that an STA may be concluded jointly with a
GTA, Sij = 1, only if an STA is concluded no matter what, Aij = 1. Use S
∗
ij to denote
the latent gains from a joint STA conditional on Aij = 1. So, in fact, what we observe is
Sij = 1(S
∗
ij > 0|Aij = 1). This lends itself to a framework where there is self-selection of
country-pairs into STAs and, conditional on that, into jointly- versus sequentially-concluded
STAs to GTAs.
Using the suggested notation, this obtains the two equations for the selection into STA and
for the choice of joint versus sequential STA to GTA for latent processes as:
A∗ij = Zijα + u
A
ij, S
∗
ij|Aij = 1 = Xijβ + uSij. (1)
For identiﬁcation of the parameters, one may follow Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) in
assuming bivariate normality of (uAij, u
S
ij) with
E
 uAij
uAij
 = N
 0
0
 ,
 1 ρ
ρ 1
 . (2)
Hence, the residuals are drawn from a bivariate truncated normal and an appropriate correc-
tion term (or control function) ensures that the parameters are estimated consistently, akin
to selection models with a continuous rather than a binary outcome (see Heckman, 1976).
Finally, we use two variants of Sij, S
n
ij and S
e
ij, for joint negotiation versus entry into force,
respectively.
3 Speciﬁcation of Zij and Xij and descriptive statistics
For parameter identiﬁcation we include instruments in Zij beyond all elements in Xij as
listed in Table 1. The table reports on the binary Aij, S
n
ij, and S
e
ij from the World Trade
Organization, and it groups their determinants in six blocks: (1) the services expenditure
share in GDP as a demand characteristic; (2) income and per-capita-income variables; (3)
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the unilateral services-trade-restrictiveness index as a measure of unilateral barriers to ser-
vices trade; (4) geographical- and cultural-distance variables as other, bilateral barriers (or
the opposite thereof) to services trade; (5) a number of variables capturing the political
environment in countries that might be important to understand the ease at which negotia-
tions could be done; (6) variables capturing the ease at which businesses can be set up in a
country and related institutional characteristics to capture aspects of the potential beneﬁt of
preferential services-trade liberalization. All of the unilateral variables in the blocks except
for (4) enter either as the sum (or average) and the squared diﬀerence for the values of two
partner countries i and j or as the minimum and maximum values in a pair of countries i and
j.3 For all variables, Table 1 provides deﬁnitions, acronyms, averages, standard deviations,
and, in the footnote, sources.
Using the data as summarized in Table 1, we ﬁnd the following pattern among STAs that
were notiﬁed and entered into eﬀect jointly versus sequentially with GTAs (see Figures 1a
and 1b corresponding to Snij and S
e
ij, respectively). Country pairs that notiﬁed STAs and
GTAs jointly (as opposed to sequentially) were, on average, more distant and less similarly
sized, with larger per-capita-income diﬀerences both relative to each other and to the rest of
the world. They had higher average and more diﬀerent levels of services-trade restrictiveness.
Country pairs that put STAs and GTAs jointly (as opposed to sequentially) into force were,
on average, less distant, larger, and more similarly sized, but with bigger per-capita-income
diﬀerences both relative to each other and to the rest of the world. They had higher average
but more similar levels of services-trade restrictiveness. Overall, Figures 1a-1b suggest that,
unconditional on other factors, there are some diﬀerences in the diﬀerential characteristics
between STAs that were merely notiﬁed and ones that were actually put into eﬀect.
4 Results
Table 2 summarizes the probit results for the two latent processes for A∗ij and S
∗
ij|Aij. The
table is organized in two blocks with four columns each. The two blocks refer to Snij (jointly
notiﬁed STAs, on the left) and Seij (jointly entered-into-force STAs, on the right). We
denote the respective columns without and with prime, respectively. Columns (1) and (1')
report results on the estimation of the linear index underlying any STA membership, A∗ij.
Regarding the determinants as listed in vertical blocks (2) and (4) and introduced by Baier
and Bergstrand (2004), we ﬁnd that larger, more similarly sized, and less geographically
3The ﬁrst option is taken for the measures in block (2) in order to facilitate the comparison with earlier
work by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), while the second approach is taken for the variables in blocks (1)-(2)
and (5)-(6). The variation spanned by the two approaches is the same.
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distant countries conclude STAs at greater likelihood (similar to the conclusion of GTAs).
Columns (2)-(4) and (2')-(4') present three versions of outcome-stage models regarding the
linear index behind the latent variable for joint adoption of STAs with GTAs, S∗ij. In those
models we use either theMinimum of Government Predictability in i and j for the most recent
year in 2002-2009, MINGOV PREDij, or the Maximum of Government Predictability in
i and j for the most recent year in 2002-2009, MAXGOV PREDij, or both as identifying
instruments.4
Countries with a higher average and more dissimilar unilateral services trade restrictiveness
are less likely to conclude STAs. Many of the doing-business, institutional, and political
variables matter as well. Given that two countries enter an STA, they are more likely do
it jointly with a GTA the larger, more similarly sized, less distant, and less unilaterally
services-trade-restricted they are, according to Columns (2)-(4) and (2')-(4'), respectively.
The diﬀerence between Columns (2), (3), and (4) and (2'), (3'), and (4'), respectively, is
the choice of identifying instruments in the ﬁrst-stage probit: only MAXGOV PREDij in
Columns (3) and (3'), only MINGOV PREDij in Columns (4) and (4'), and both of them
in Columns (2) and (2'). Since the two instruments together are not jointly signiﬁcant in
the second-stage probit but MAXGOV PREDij alone is, we consider Columns (4) and (4')
the preferable speciﬁcation. This view is also supported by the likelihood statistic.5
Let us focus on the eﬀects of unilateral services-trade restrictiveness on the joint versus
sequential entering of an STA with a GTA. We report eﬀects of a ceteris-paribus increase of
MAXSTRIij by one standard deviation in Table 3 (taking the nonlinearity of the selection
model and also the nonlinearity of the linear index in terms of covariates into account).6
Increasing MAXSTRIij by one standard deviation raises the average level and also raise
the discrepancy in unilateral services-trade costs between two partner countries. According
to Table 3, doing so will reduce both the probability of entering any STA and, in particular, of
entering it jointly with a GTA. In the preferable Speciﬁcations (4) and (4'), the probability
of entering a joint STA with a GTA declines by about 0.56% in response to raising the
maximum STRI for a pair of countries by one standard deviation in Speciﬁcation (4) for
notiﬁcation and by about 0.18% in Speciﬁcation (4') for entering into force.
4This choice is inspired by the fact that an unconditional probit model for Sij that includes both
MINGOV PREDij and MAXGOV PREDij together yields statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on both
of them. Moreover, these variables reﬂect government stability which should be related to the inclination of
a country's political regime towards negotiations.
5While most results reported in columns (4) and (4') are qualitatively similar, diﬀerence in economic size
and being a part of the same country have no statistical signiﬁcance in column (4) while the minimum of
unilateral services regulation in the dyad has no impact on joint negotiation in column (4').
6DGDPPCij enters the speciﬁcation in quadratic form so that not only Aij and Sij are nonlinear in both
variables and parameters but also Zijα and Xijβ are nonlinear in some of the variables.
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Figure 1a: Characteristics of country pairs with jointly relative to sequentially notified STAs 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Characteristics of country pairs with jointly relative to sequentially put-in-force STAs 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Acronym Type Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Services-Trade-Agreement Membership (0)
   Either GTA or STA Membership Status Between i and j in 2015 (end August) Aij binary 0.1100 0.3130 0 1
   Simultaneous Negotiation of STA and GTA Between i and j in 2015 (end August) by year of notification Snij binary 0.7474 0.4349 0 1
   Simultaneous Negotiation of STA and GTA Between i and j in 2015 (end August) by year of entry into force Seij binary 0.8322 0.3740 0 1
Services Share in GDP (1)
   Minimum Share of Services in GDP between i and j MINSRATIOij bounded 44.8621 14.1553 10.44 71.55
   Maximum Share of Services in GDP between i and j MAXSRATIOij bounded 42.6153 13.0086 10.44 71.55
Absolute and Relative Size and Endowment Variables (2)
   Log Sum of GDP of i and j SUMGDPij continuous 49.2461 2.5448 42.1580 57.7910
   Absolute Difference in Log GDP of i and j DGDPij bounded 2.0804 1.5085 0 8.6787
   Absolute Difference in Log GDP per Capita of i and j DGDPPCij bounded 1.4505 1.0330 0.0004 4.9922
   Squared Absolute Difference in Log GDP per Capita of i and j DGDPPC2ij bounded 3.1709 3.8722 0.0000 24.9222
   Absolute Difference in Log GDP per Capita of i plus j with Rest-of-World DRGDPPCij bounded 1.0736 0.4934 0.0023 2.6897
Unilateral Services Trade Restrictiveness (3)
   Minimum Log Services-trade Restrictiveness Index in i and j MINSTRIij bounded -1.4413 0.5116 -2.7166 0.6500
   Maximum Log Services-trade Restrictiveness Index in i and j MAXSTRIij bounded -0.6052 0.7248 -2.1010 2.0115
Geographical and Cultural Distance (4) 
   Log Bilateral Distance Between i and j DISTij continuous 8.7138 0.7694 4.9345 9.8940
   Common Legal System Between i and j COMLAWij binary 0.3301 0.4703 0 1
   Common Language Between i and j COMLANGij binary 0.1361 0.3429 0 1
   Colonial Relationship Between i and j COLONYij binary 0.0177 0.1319 0 1
   Common Colonizer Between i and j COMCOLij binary 0.0567 0.2313 0 1
   Units i and j Belonged to the Same Country SAMECTRYij binary 0.0080 0.0891 0 1
Politics (5)
   Minimum of Polity IV Index in i and j in 1980 MINPOLITY80ij bounded -11.5427 23.1444 -88 10
   Maximum of Polity IV Index in i and j in 1980 MAXPOLITY80ij bounded 1.1031 12.0755 -88 10
   Minimum of Regime Durability Index in i and j in 1980 MINREGDUR80ij bounded 12.0904 16.9013 0 171
   Maximum of Regime Durability Index in i and j in 1980 MAXREGDUR80ij bounded 32.1513 31.7422 0 171
   Minimum of State Fragility Index in i and j in 1995 MINSFI95ij bounded 5.9022 5.3334 0 22
   Maximum of State Fragility Index in i and j in 1995 MAXSFI95ij bounded 13.6513 5.5411 0 23
Doing Business and Institutional Variables (6)
   Minimum of Institutional Quality in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MININSTQUALij bounded -0.1263 0.3770 -0.884148 0.8048378
   Maximum of Institutional Quality in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MAXINSTQUALij bounded -0.1263 0.3770 -0.884148 0.8048378
   Minimum of Government Predictability in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MINGOVPREDij bounded 0.4332 0.1272 0.170588 0.7864373
   Maximum of Government Predictability in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MAXGOVPREDij bounded 0.4928 0.1317 0.170588 0.7864373
   Minimum Log Number of Steps to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINSTEPS99ij continuous 2.0186 0.5609 0.693147 2.995732
   Maximum Log Number of Steps to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXSTEPS99ij continuous 2.3397 0.4627 0.693147 2.995732
   Minimum Log Number of Procedures to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINPROC99ij continuous 2.1317 0.5387 0.693147 3.044523
   Maximum Log Number of Procedures to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXPROC99ij continuous 2.4300 0.4317 0.693147 3.044523
   Minimum Log Number of Time Taken to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINTIME99ij continuous 3.3661 0.9949 0.6931 5.0239
   Maximum Log Number of Time Taken to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXTIME99ij continuous 3.8779 0.7613 0.6931 5.0239
   Minimum Log Cost to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINCOST99ij continuous 5.8304 1.2989 2.450143 8.865785
   Maximum Log Cost to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXCOST99ij continuous 6.6696 1.3042 2.450143 8.865785
   Minimum Cost to Register a Business as % of PCGDP in i and j in 1999 MINCOSTPCT99ij bounded 0.3145 0.5761 0 4.63
   Maximum Cost to Register a Business as % of PCGDP in i and j in 1999 MAXCOSTPCT99ij bounded 0.6369 0.9127 0 4.63
Notes: The sources for the variables in the table are the following by block: (0) World Trade Organization; (1) (2) and (3) World Bank; (4) Centre d'Études Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales; (5) Polity IV Project and Center for Systemic Peace; (6) Djankov et al. (2002) and Gennaioli et al. (2013).
Table 2: Probit results for Aij and Sij|Aij=1 
Dependent variables: Aij = Any STA membership; Snij = Simultaneous negotiation of STA and GTA by year of notification; Seij = Simultaneous negotiation of STA and GTA by year of entry into force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1') (2') (3') (4')
Regressor Acronym Aij Snij Snij Snij Aij Seij Seij Seij
Services Share in GDP (1)
   Minimum Share of Services in GDP between i and j MINSRATIOij 0.0036 0.0504*** 0.0485*** 0.0524*** 0.0036 0.0515*** 0.0462*** 0.0512***
(0.0036) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0036) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0147)
   Maximum Share of Services in GDP between i and j MAXSRATIOij 0.0209*** 0.1016*** 0.0934*** 0.1063*** 0.0209*** 0.1265*** 0.1104*** 0.1432***
(0.0038) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0169) (0.0038) (0.0228) (0.0230) (0.0252)
Absolute and Relative Size and Endowment Variables (2)
   Log Sum of GDP of i and j SUMGDPij 0.1076*** 0.3223*** 0.3233*** 0.4292*** 0.1076*** 0.6164*** 0.6147*** 0.8930***
(0.0293) (0.0895) (0.0893) (0.0959) (0.0293) (0.1286) (0.1276) (0.1583)
   Absolute Difference in Log GDP of i and j DGDPij -0.1112*** -0.1479 -0.1051 -0.1465 -0.1112*** -0.3398** -0.2660* -0.4265**
(0.0308) (0.1042) (0.1032) (0.1092) (0.0308) (0.1312) (0.1307) (0.1431)
   Absolute Difference in Log GDP per Capita of i and j DGDPPCij 0.1867 -1.0450* -1.1676* -0.8466# 0.1867 -0.7352 -0.9630# -0.3707
(0.2017) (0.4927) (0.4986) (0.4907) (0.2017) (0.5426) (0.5365) (0.5671)
   Squared Absolute Difference in Log GDP per Capita of i and j DGDPPC2ij -0.1757* 0.2023 0.2513 -0.0737 -0.1757* -0.0590 0.0285 -0.5859#
(0.0775) (0.2422) (0.2441) (0.2446) (0.0775) (0.3020) (0.2993) (0.3438)
   Absolute Difference in Log GDP per Capita of i plus j with Rest-of-World DRGDPPCij 0.1213 -0.7685* -0.8589* -0.8556* 0.1213 -0.8254* -0.9412* -0.9508*
(0.1826) (0.3633) (0.3515) (0.3427) (0.1826) (0.4130) (0.4030) (0.3924)
Unilateral Services Trade Restrictiveness (3)
   Minimum Log Services-trade Restrictiveness Index in i and j MINSTRIij 0.3643** -0.6539 -0.9534# -0.9438* 0.3643** -0.3001 -0.7936 -0.8128
(0.1171) (0.4127) (0.4904) (0.4314) (0.1171) (0.5007) (0.5698) (0.5428)
   Maximum Log Services-trade Restrictiveness Index in i and j MAXSTRIij -1.0865*** -3.4145*** -2.9804*** -3.6332*** -1.0865*** -4.9496*** -4.1974*** -5.9952***
(0.1050) (0.7290) (0.8096) (0.7579) (0.1050) (0.9695) (0.9625) (1.1459)
Geographical and Cultural Distance (4) 
   Log Bilateral Distance Between i and j DISTij -0.5022*** -0.9441*** -0.8478** -1.2617*** -0.5022*** -1.5232*** -1.3352*** -2.3177***
(0.0514) (0.2580) (0.2730) (0.2780) (0.0514) (0.3337) (0.3246) (0.4422)
   Common Legal System Between i and j COMLAWij -0.1951* -0.4748# -0.4595# -0.6046* -0.1951* -0.6444* -0.5651# -0.9295**
(0.0988) (0.2707) (0.2725) (0.2760) (0.0988) (0.3271) (0.3260) (0.3543)
   Common Language Between i and j COMLANGij 0.2538# 1.4062** 1.2334** 1.3866** 0.2538# 2.4321*** 2.1535*** 2.7013***
(0.1529) (0.4457) (0.4475) (0.4421) (0.1529) (0.6269) (0.5996) (0.6537)
   Colonial Relationship Between i and j COLONYij -0.2960 -0.9755 -0.8864 -1.3065* -0.2960 -1.8345** -1.7140* -2.7074***
(0.3062) (0.5970) (0.6098) (0.6273) (0.3062) (0.7046) (0.6825) (0.7405)
   Common Colonizer Between i and j COMCOLij 0.0724 2.2677* 2.2316* 1.9383* 0.0724 4.0121*** 3.9460*** 3.8924***
(0.3224) (0.9184) (0.9038) (0.8908) (0.3224) (1.1225) (1.0406) (0.9884)
   Units i and j Belonged to the Same Country SAMECTRYij -0.0900 -0.1711 -0.1588 -0.2915 -0.0900 -1.4724* -1.4895* -2.0964**
(0.4079) (0.6320) (0.6559) (0.7178) (0.4079) (0.6417) (0.6149) (0.6547)
Politics (5)
   Minimum of Polity IV Index in i and j in 1980 MINPOLITY80ij -0.0114*** -0.0276*** -0.0257*** -0.0367*** -0.0114*** -0.0535*** -0.0503*** -0.0773***
(0.0021) (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0079) (0.0021) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0133)
   Maximum of Polity IV Index in i and j in 1980 MAXPOLITY80ij 0.0092 0.0300** 0.0285** 0.0354*** 0.0092 0.0266* 0.0243* 0.0444***
(0.0056) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0056) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0112)
   Minimum of Regime Durability Index in i and j in 1980 MINREGDUR80ij -0.0037 -0.0058 -0.0054 -0.0072 -0.0037 0.0349** 0.0344* 0.0271#
(0.0026) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0026) (0.0132) (0.0134) (0.0142)
   Maximum of Regime Durability Index in i and j in 1980 MAXREGDUR80ij 0.0012 0.0060 0.0054 0.0056 0.0012 0.0378*** 0.0372*** 0.0405***
(0.0021) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0021) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0085)
   Minimum of State Fragility Index in i and j in 1995 MINSFI95ij -0.0741*** -0.1693* -0.1514* -0.2434*** -0.0741*** -0.2873** -0.2609* -0.4710***
(0.0147) (0.0658) (0.0675) (0.0669) (0.0147) (0.1072) (0.1074) (0.1229)
   Maximum of State Fragility Index in i and j in 1995 MAXSFI95ij -0.0167 -0.0304 -0.0171 -0.0104 -0.0167 0.0640* 0.0896** 0.1034**
(0.0111) (0.0250) (0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0111) (0.0296) (0.0338) (0.0318)
Doing Business and Institutional Variables (6)
   Minimum of Institutional Quality in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MININSTQUALij 1.1547*** 3.3250*** 2.7809** 3.8837*** 1.1547*** 4.6011*** 3.7360*** 6.0276***
(0.2052) (0.8054) (0.9213) (0.8428) (0.2052) (0.8815) (0.9263) (1.0550)
   Maximum of Institutional Quality in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MAXINSTQUALij -0.5296** -2.1848*** -2.2113*** -3.4824*** -0.5296** -2.5397*** -2.5811*** -4.9459***
(0.1916) (0.5035) (0.5088) (0.6515) (0.1916) (0.5964) (0.5985) (0.9201)
   Minimum of Government Predictability in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MINGOVPREDij -1.8766** 1.7671 -1.8766** 2.6467
(0.6398) (1.4080) (0.6398) (1.7437)
   Maximum of Government Predictability in i and j for most recent year between 2002-2009 MAXGOVPREDij 1.6358** 3.8406*** 1.6358** 6.6617***
(0.5435) (1.0705) (0.5435) (1.4973)
   Minimum Log Number of Steps to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINSTEPS99ij -0.2154 0.9542 1.1662 1.0908 -0.2154 1.4943# 1.7934* 1.8631*
(0.2421) (0.6766) (0.7122) (0.6898) (0.2421) (0.7673) (0.8095) (0.8357)
   Maximum Log Number of Steps to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXSTEPS99ij -1.3592*** -5.5868*** -4.9676*** -5.6367*** -1.3592*** -5.9427*** -5.0066** -7.2373***
(0.3171) (1.0499) (1.1584) (1.0695) (0.3171) (1.5036) (1.5821) (1.5473)
   Minimum Log Number of Procedures to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINPROC99ij 0.1887 -2.2609* -2.4802* -2.4935** 0.1887 -2.2741# -2.5896* -2.7084*
(0.3294) (0.9318) (0.9633) (0.9376) (0.3294) (1.1608) (1.1711) (1.2048)
   Maximum Log Number of Procedures to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXPROC99ij 0.7842# 3.0465** 2.3891* 2.4195* 0.7842# 2.4968# 1.6594 2.7237#
(0.4090) (0.9566) (1.0698) (0.9862) (0.4090) (1.3676) (1.4613) (1.3979)
   Minimum Log Number of Time Taken to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINTIME99ij 0.2371# 1.5481*** 1.4913*** 1.6662*** 0.2371# 1.7014*** 1.5871*** 2.0368***
(0.1226) (0.2972) (0.3003) (0.3065) (0.1226) (0.3919) (0.3915) (0.4053)
   Maximum Log Number of Time Taken to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXTIME99ij 0.2570# 0.6702* 0.6459* 0.8837** 0.2570# 1.2473*** 1.1581** 1.5850***
(0.1333) (0.2803) (0.2821) (0.2948) (0.1333) (0.3650) (0.3651) (0.3970)
   Minimum Log Cost to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MINCOST99ij 0.1465*** 0.2350 0.1977 0.3229* 0.1465*** -0.4063* -0.4678* -0.1721
(0.0406) (0.1490) (0.1508) (0.1555) (0.0406) (0.1942) (0.1953) (0.2160)
   Maximum Log Cost to Register a Business in i and j in 1999 MAXCOST99ij -0.0985# -0.5356** -0.5197** -0.5819*** -0.0985# -0.2473 -0.2220 -0.4708*
(0.0544) (0.1694) (0.1691) (0.1646) (0.0544) (0.2059) (0.2069) (0.2255)
   Minimum Cost to Register a Business as % of PCGDP in i and j in 1999 MINCOSTPCT99ij -0.3094* -0.4391 -0.5255 -0.9465 -0.3094* 0.4717 0.3016 -0.7226
(0.1553) (0.9620) (0.9583) (0.9437) (0.1553) (0.9036) (0.8520) (0.8281)
   Maximum Cost to Register a Business as % of PCGDP in i and j in 1999 MAXCOSTPCT99ij 0.0720 1.4122** 1.4696** 1.3996* 0.0720 0.9597*** 0.9883*** 1.1839***
(0.0520) (0.5455) (0.5380) (0.5485) (0.0520) (0.2105) (0.2052) (0.1907)
   Selection bias term IMRij 3.3335*** 2.8205** 3.9724*** 3.4670*** 2.6086* 5.1596***
(0.8087) (0.9017) (0.8324) (0.9951) (1.0281) (1.2024)
   Constant CONSTANT -3.6885* -18.9114*** -18.8863*** -24.3328*** -3.6885* -32.6884*** -32.4803*** -46.4740***
(1.5581) (4.4603) (4.4252) (4.8942) (1.5581) (6.0526) (5.9378) (7.4969)
Model characteristics
   Observations (country pairs) 3311 377 377 377 3311 377 377 377
   Explanatory power 0.5259 0.4809 0.4848 0.5230 0.5259 0.5280 0.5380 0.5507
   Likelihood ratio test 1.52 10.93 1.52 10.93
   p-value 0.2181 0.0009 0.2181 0.0009
Notes:  ***, **, *, and # indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10%, respectively, based on two-sided test statistics.
Table 3: Effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in MINSTRIij and, alternatively, MAXSTRIij on P(STAnij=1) and P(STAeij=1)
Dependent variables: Aij = Any STA membership; Snij = Simultaneous negotiation of STA and GTA by year of notification; Seij = Simultaneous negotiation of STA and GTA by year of entry into force
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1') (2') (3') (4')
Regressor Acronym Aij Snij Snij Snij Aij Seij Seij Seij
   Minimum Log Services-trade Restrictiveness Index in i and j MINSTRIij 0.0021*** -0.0547 -0.0940# -0.0824* 0.0021*** -0.0069 -0.0210 -0.01156
(0.0006) (0.0364) (0.0530) (0.0416) (0.0006) (0.0122) (0.0176) (0.0103)
   Maximum Log Services-trade Restrictiveness Index in i and j MAXSTRIij -0.0055*** -0.5044*** -0.4849*** -0.5569*** -0.0055*** -0.2208** -0.1871** -0.1800*
(0.0008) (0.1245) (0.1375) (0.1331) (0.0008) (0.0766) (0.0686) (0.0802)
Notes:  ***, **, *, and # indicate statistical significance at 0.1, 1, 5, and 10%, respectively, based on two-sided test statistics.
